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NOTE
Legal and Professional Ethics: The Regulation of
Ancillaries and Law-Related Services Reaches Oklahoma*
. Introduction
During the past twenty years, the practice of law has ostensibly evolved
from a profession to a business,' as law firms have sought to expand profits
by providing law-related services to clients.2 These services are not performed
by the law firm itself, but rather are performed by ancillaries, entities the law
firm owns and manages with nonlawyers. 3 This multidisciplinary integration
between lawyers and various other business specialists ignited an ethical
controversy within the legal profession. In response to this controversy, the
American Bar Association (ABA) adopted Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.7, regulating the law-related services that lawyers can provide their
clients. The Rule reads as follows:
Rule 5.7: Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional
Conduct with respect to the provision of law-related services, as
defined in paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from
the lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
* The author would like to thank Professor Judith L. Maute, University of Oklahoma
College of Law, and Tom McConnell, Member, Oklahoma Bar Association Rules of
Professional Conduct Committee for their assistance.
1. See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism:Remarks at the Dedication of the
University of Oklahoma'sLaw School Building and Library,2002, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 200
(2002) ("There are lawyers who never hear the law's music - indeed, those who think there
is none; those who think the law is just a business . ").
2. This subject presents certain definitional problems. See JAMES W. JONES, BEYOND
LEGAL PRACTICE: ORGANIZING AND MANAGING ANCILLARY BUSINESSES 7 (2002) [hereinafter
BEYOND LEGALPRACrICE]. One treatise on the subject of professional responsibility uses three
terms to describe these activities: ancillary business services, non-law subsidiaries, and lawrelated services. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON

PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY 638-39 (2002). The conceptual similarities include (1) services

similar enough to the practice of law that customers and clients would expect them to be offered
by lawyers, and (2) services that could be performed by nonlawyers without violating laws
regarding the unauthorized practice of law. This note considers "ancillaries" to be entities
which satisfy these requirements and are managed, directed, or operated in part by nonlawyers.
3. See Thomas F. Gibbons, Branching Out, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 70, 73 (reporting
more than sixty-two law firms starting ancillaries in the two years prior to 1989).
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(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the
lawyer individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take
reasonable measures to assure that a person obtaining the lawrelated services knows that the services are not legal services and
that the protection of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not
prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a
non-lawyer.4
In September 2002, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, at the behest of the
Oklahoma Bar Association's (OBA) Board of Governors, responded to the
controversy surrounding ancillaries by adopting verbatim ABA Model Rule
5.7. Eight justices voted to adopt ABA Model Rule 5.7; however, the vote
was not unanimous because Justice Opala failed to participate in the court's
decision.5 Regarding Justice Opala' s abstention, Tom McConnell - advocate
for the Rule's adoption before the Oklahoma Supreme Court - has suggested
that Justice Opala is "old enough and smart enough to know that [lawyers] can
never ask all the questions [they] need to [ask]." 6
This note embraces the notion behind Justice Opala's nonparticipation in
the vote by analyzing some of the questions left unresolved in the wake of
Oklahoma's adoption of Rule 5.7. Indeed, Oklahoma is only the eleventh state
to adopt a version of the Model Rule since its passage in 1994. 7 A main
concern for Oklahoma practitioners, the ethics and rules committee of the
OBA, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court is whether Rule 5.7 sufficiently
addresses the many ethical issues created by ancillaries and law-related
services. Considerable confusion exists regarding the actual purpose of the

4. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2002).

5. Interview with Tom McConnell, Member, Rules of Professional Conduct Committee,
sponsor of Oklahoma Rule 5.7, in Norman, Okla. (Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter McConnell
Interview]. The vote on the adoption of Rule 5.7 was unanimous at the committee level,
unanimous at the Board of Governor's level, and nearly unanimous before the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, with Justice Opala being the lone nonparticipant. Id.
6. Id.
7. See DEL. LAWYER'S RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.7 (1985); FLA. RULES OFPROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4-5.7 (1987); GA. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.7 (2001); IND. RULES OF
PROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.7 (1987); MASS. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.7 (1998); N.Y. CODE
OFPROF'LRESPONSIBILITY R. 5.7 (1999); N.D. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.7 (1988); OKLA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1983); PENN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1988);
TENN. CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSIBIUTY R. 5.7 (2003); VT. CODE OFPROF' LRESPONSIBILUTY R.
5.7 (1999).
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Rule and whether it is superfluous, in the event that all other Model Rules are
strictly adhered to in the context of ancillaries and law-related services. 8
In an attempt to dispel confusion, Part II of this note traces the history of
law-related services, the advent of ancillaries, and the ABA and OBA
legislative history regarding these two interconnected issues. Part III provides
a general review of the ethical treatment of ancillaries and law-related services
under the various contemplated versions of Model Rule 5.7, and Part IV
analyzes the current version of the Rule. Part V then focuses on the Rule's
effect on the provision of law-related services to clients, arguing that a proper
application of existing ABA Rules of Professional Conduct renders the Rule
unnecessary. Finally, Part VI explores the effect of the Rule on those it
intends to protect: non-client customers.
II. Attracting the Attention of the ABA
A. The Evolutionfrom Merely 'Law-Related' to 'Ancillary'
Since colonial times, lawyers have provided nonlegal services ancillary to
the practice of law. Following the American Revolution, lawyers primarily
served English creditors by collecting debt and recovering property under
confiscatory laws. 9 These law-related services, services that could be
performed by a lawyer or a nonlawyer, expanded in the nineteenth century to
include accounting, financial planning, and marriage counseling. Given the
practitioner's education, areas of expertise, and relationship with the client,
all of these law-related services were readily sought by clients. 0 Throughout
the twentieth century, lawyers continued to provide services ancillary to their
legal practices, including acting as agents for title insurance companies in
connection with transactions in which the lawyers also represented one of the
parties, providing trust services as adjuncts to their probate practices, and
serving as trustees in bankruptcy."

8. See Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 316 (2001), available at
http:lwww.okbar.orglethicsl316.htm (applying pre-existing rules in the ancillary context);
ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at 638 ("[O]ne can think of Rule 5.7 as an elaboration of the general
principles found in Rule 1.8(a).").
9. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 179-80 (1953).
10. BEYOND LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 3.
11. WORKING GROUP ON ANCILLARY Bus. AcTIvITIEs OF THE ABA's SPECIAL
COORDINATING COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, FINAL REPORT ON THE ANCILLARY BUSINESS

ACTIVITIES OFLAWYERS AND LAW FIRMS 10-11 (1990). In Massachusetts, ancillaries providing
trust services have grown to the point where they are sometimes registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. BEYOND LEGAL
PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 4.
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These services attracted the attention of the American Bar Association in
the 1980s because of the increasing practice of large, high-profile firms
providing law-related services to both clients and nonclients through
subsidiaries partly owned and controlled by nonlawyers. 2 This practice began
in response to a decrease in the firms' revenues caused by the encroachment
by other professionals into areas of practice in which lawyers historically had
provided services.' 3 As clients came to expect these services from nonlegal
professionals, 4 law firms sought to capitalize on these expectations by
establishing ancillaries as a means to regain lost sources of income. These
subsidiaries assisted the firm in regaining market share by providing nonlegal
services to legal customers.' 5 Furthermore, by extending ownership privileges
to nonlawyers, law firms succeeded in attracting highly competent and famous
individuals from the political and business sectors to attract and retain
clients.' 6 Ancillaries of this kind have proliferated throughout the country,' 7
12. In 1984, the American Bar Association formed the Commission on Professionalism at
the request of Chief Justice Warren Burger, who expressed concerns about lawyers venturing
into business activities. Burger encouraged the Commission to examine the effect these services
have on the legal profession in general and the effect such practices would have on public
perception. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, Report to the House of Delegates, 112 F.R.D.
243, 280-81 (1986) [hereinafter Report on Professionalism].
13. For example, potential legal clients have come to choose accountants over lawyers for
many services traditionally performed by lawyers. PROF'L RESP. PRAC. BULL. (Prof'l
Responsibility Practice Group, Butzel Long), Fall 2001, at 1, availableat http://www.butzel.
com/pub/bulpdf/prcOlfa.pdf (reporting that businesses turn to accountants more frequently for
tax return preparation, financial statement audits, valuation, expatriate taxation, and investment
advisory services).
14. Id.
15. Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Oklahoma Rules of Professional
Conduct prohibit the practice of law by nonlawyers. See MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT
R. 5.5 (2002); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2002). The ancillary avoids this
ethical prohibition by providing no services that are considered the "unauthorized practice of
law"; therefore, lawyers and nonlawyers do not divide "legal fees." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2002); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2002) (emphasis
added). Moreover, operation of the ancillary business does not constitute forming a partnership
with a nonlawyer because none of the business's activities constitute the "practice of law."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2002); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
5.4(b) (2002).
16. See generally ROTUNDA, supra note 2, at 638. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, New
Venture Hopes to Offer Some Peace of Mind to C.E.O. 's, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002, at CI
(reporting that former vice-presidential candidate Jack Kemp is to serve as chairman of Patton
Boggs's and Fulbright & Jaworski's Corporate Diagnostics, assisting customers in meeting
government regulatory requirements).
17. One legal consultant estimates that there are close to one-hundred firms in the United
States operating close to 150 ancillaries. E-mail from Bob Denney, Robert Denney Associates,
Inc., to Kencade Babb (Jan. 30, 2003, 09:54 CST) (on file with author). Another consultant and
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are beginning to gain a presence in the Southwest,"8 and have established a
foothold in Oklahoma. 19
B. The Bars Respond
In 1991, the American Bar Association generated two competing proposals
for dealing with the ethical issues created by ancillaries and law-related
services.2 0 The more conservative of the two approaches called for a complete
ban on ancillaries. The ABA enacted this approach as the original Model
Rule 5.7 in 1991 2 However, it rescinded the rule the following year 2 in part

legal author has verified the existence of eighty-five firms operating 135 ancillaries. E-mail
from James W. Jones, Legal Consultant and Author of BEYOND LEGAL PRACTICE: ORGANIZING
AND MANAGING ANCILLARY BUSINESSES (2002), to Kencade Babb (Feb. 4, 2003, 15:56 CST)
(on file with author).
18. Last year, Armstrong Teasdale in St. Louis launched Lawgical Choice to provide
technical services to law firms. Heather Cole, Armstrong, Bryan Cave Build Case for
Technology, ST. Louis Bus. J., Sept. 6,2002, at 30A-3 1A, availableat http://www.bizjournals.
com/stlouis/storiesl2002/09/09/focus6.html. Kansas City firm Lathrop & Gage launched a
human resources consulting firm in March 2002, the first ancillary business started by a Kansas
Business Summary, Bus. J. OF KANSAS CITY, Mar. 4, 2002,
City law firm.
http://www.hildebrandt.com/homelhildheadlines?&id[ 11=810&article-id[ 1]=911 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2002).
19. The law firm of McAfee & Taft, P.C. in Oklahoma City maintains three ancillary
businesses: a financial services company, which complements its estate planning and employee
benefits practice; a human resources business complementing its employment, health care and
immigration practice; and an aircraft title insurance agency, which complements the firm's
aviation practice. Memorandum from John M. Hermes, Managing Director, McAfee & Taft,
to Dean Lawrence Hellman, Chair, Oklahoma Bar Association Rules Committee (July 6, 2001)
[hereinafter Hermes Memorandum] (on file with author).
20. See BEYOND LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 5. The ABA's Special Coordinating
Committee on Professionalism responded to the Report on Professionalism by appointing a
Working Group on Ancillary Business Activities in 1989, directing the Working Group to
consider whether the ABA needed to amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
address possible ethical problems arising from law-related subsidiaries. Id. The Working
Group's proposal recommended that the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (CEPR) draft an ethics rule to regulate rather than prohibit law-related
subsidiaries. Id. The CEPR drafted such a rule and recommended its adoption to the ABA
House of Delegates in 1991. ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, Inroads on Client Confidences,
7 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 256 (Aug. 28, 1991). However, the ABA adopted
the Litigation Section's more restrictive proposal instead. Id.
21. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.7 (1991) (repealed 1992), reprinted in AM.
BAR ASS'N, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-1998, at 248 (1999) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
22. Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 265.
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because no state chose to adopt its restrictive mandate. 3 The ABA reconsidered the issue of ancillaries and law-related services over the next two years,
and its House of Delegates finally adopted a new Model Rule in 1994. The
second version of Model Rule 5.7, nearly identical to the current version of
4
the Rule, regulated, rather than prohibited, ancillaries.1
In contrast to the ABA pushing for the passage of Model Rule 5.7,
practitioners provided the impetus for the Rule's passage in Oklahoma. Four
of the largest law firms in Oklahoma,25 comprising more than three hundred
Oklahoma lawyers, sent letters to Dean Lawrence Hellman, 6 Chair of the
OBA's committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct, urging him to
address the issue of ancillaries and law-related services in Oklahoma. 7 The
Managing Director of McAfee & Taft, P.C., an Oklahoma City law firm that
operates three ancillaries,2 8 recommended that the OBA committee ignore the
ancillary/nonancillary distinction, and stressed that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court had already endorsed, by implication, the provision of all law-related
services in Oklahoma. 29 He further emphasized that ethically, lawyers could
engage in the provision of law-related services under the then-existing
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct and that the adoption of Model Rule
5.7 would merely provide guidance to the members of the Oklahoma Bar.3 °
Following one year of deliberation, the OBA Committee recommended to the
Board of Governors that Oklahoma adopt Model Rule 5.7. The Board of
Governors unanimously supported this recommendation and sent a proposal to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court asking it to adopt the Rule.3 Tom McConnell, a
member of the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee, argued before the
court that the Rule was necessary not as an implicit endorsement of law-related
subsidiaries, but as a protection to clients who already received their services.32

23. ABA Rescinds Model Rule BarringAncillary Business, 8 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 261 (Aug. 26, 1992).
24. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.7 (1994), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 266.
25. These law firms were McAfee & Taft, P.C., Gable & Gotwals, P.C., Crowe & Dunlevy,
P.C., and Phillips, McFall, McCaffery, McVay, and Murrah, P.C. McConnell Interview, supra
note 5.
26. Hellman is the Dean of Oklahoma City University's School of Law.
27. Hermes Memorandum, supra note 19.
28. See id.
29. Id. (referring to State of Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Israel, 2001 OK 42, 25
P.2d 909).
30. Id.
31. McConnell Interview, supra note 5.
32. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/24

2003]

NOTE

Despite years of ideological wrangling at the ABA level, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court approved the ABA's modified version of Model Rule 5.7.
III. Competing Concerns and Competing Methods
The nearly uncontested adoption of Rule 5.7 in Oklahoma is surprising,
given the competing concerns surrounding ancillaries that led the ABA to
develop different methods for their ethical treatment. An analysis of these
different approaches provides an understanding of the benefits and drawbacks
of each method.
A. Drawingan Invisible Line in the Sand: The 1991 Model Rule
The controversial original Model Rule 5.7 passed by a mere 2% margin at
the ABA annual meeting in August 1991.33 Many members of the ABA were
troubled34 that the Rule prohibited lawyers and firms from operating or
acquiring a controlling interest in a separate ancillary.35 The Rule also
severely restricted the ability of lawyers to provide law-related services in a
traditional manner. The Rule prohibited lawyers from providing law-related
services to nonclients, or even legal clients who were receiving legal services
pursuant to a matter unrelated to the nonlegal service being offered.36 Finally,
33. The ABA adopted the Rule after a standing vote with 197 in favor and 186 opposed.
supra note 21, at 254; see ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, supra note
20, at 256.
34. See, e.g., ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, supra note 20, at 257 (noting that a
"prohibition [is] unwarranted by the facts and unsympathetic to all the medium and small firms
around the country that have provided title insurance and trust services for years").
35. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1991) (repealed 1992), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 247. The rule states:
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a law firm which owns a controlling
interest in, or operates, an entity which provides non-legal services which are
ancillary to the practice of law, or otherwise provides such ancillary non-legal
services, except as provided in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a law firm which provides non-legal services
which are ancillary to the practice of law if:
(1) The ancillary services are provided solely to clients of the law firm and are
incidental to, in connection with and concurrent to, the provision of legal services
by the law firm to such clients;
(2) Such ancillary services are provided solely by employees of the law firm
itself and not by a subsidiary or other affiliate of the law firm;
(3) The law firm makes appropriate disclosure in writing to its clients; and
(4) The law firm does not hold itself out as engaging in any non-legal activities
except in conjunction with the provision of legal services, as provided in this rule.
Id.
36. Id. at 5.7(b)(1), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 248.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
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the Rule permitted only the lawyer or an employee of the lawyer from
providing the services, which prohibited law firms from operating ancillaries
as a separate department within the firm. 37
The Rule's proponents advanced two lines of reasoning in support of the
ban on ancillaries. First, they concluded that a ban on law-related activities
unconnected to the provision of legal services was necessary to prevent the
avarice symptomatic of a decline in professionalism. 8 Lawyers and firms,
proponents argued, pursued the almighty dollar to the peril of a self-regulated
bar.39 As lawyers began to engage in activities that were regulated by state
legislatures, the bar feared that the legislatures would compel changes in the
manner by which lawyers could provide legal services to their clients.4" The
public, it was theorized, would likely demand outside regulation because
lawyers' unique standing as servants of the court had disintegrated to such an
extent that concerns regarding separation of powers were outweighed by the
need to regulate perceived corruption.4 Moreover, the drafters of the original
version of Rule 5.7 contended that lawyers, by devoting more time to lawrelated business ventures, would fail to satisfy their obligations to clients.42
37. Id. at 5.7(b)(2), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 248.
38. Advocates of professionalism have, since the time of the debate over Model Rule 5.7,
developed separate codes of behavior, serving as aspirational models, distinct from the ethical
standards reflected in the Rules. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Alston, The Ten Commandments of
Professionalism:A Misguided Effort, 13 PROF. LAW. 24 (2002). See generally Sandra Day
O'Connor, Professionalism, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 5 (1998); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Finns,
CompetitionPenalties,and the Values of Professionalism,13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 1 (1999);
William H. Simon, Ethics, Professionalism,and Meaningful Work, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 445
(1998). For an overview of this trend and its impact on other areas of legal practice, see Judith
C. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance
Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 147-55 (2002).
39. Litig. Section, ABA, Recommendation and Report to the House of Delegates 1(1991)
(Executive Summary).
40. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.7 (1991) (repealed 1992), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 248; Dennis J. Block et al., Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.7: Its Origin and Interpretation,5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (1992)
(arguing that the provision of law-related services inevitably leads to a loss of self-regulation).
41. Block et al., supra note 40, at 739. The last survey conducted by the ABA found that
the public holds lawyers in lower regard than members of almost any other profession. Only
19% of surveyed Americans expressed that they were "extremely" or "very" confident in
lawyers and the profession. Those surveyed described lawyers as greedy, manipulative, and
corrupt. Mary P. Gallagher, ABA Survey Finds Lawyers Among Lowest-Regarded U.S.
Professions, 168 N.J. L.J. 411 (2002).
42. Litig. Section, supranote 39, at 1 (Executive Summary). The Litigation Section's Task
Force on Ancillary Business Activities, the body that drafted the 1991 Model Rule,
characterized the difference between the practice of the law and other professions in this way:
Essential to the Litigation Section's approach was the belief and conviction that
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Finally, proponents of the ban asserted that independence of professional
judgment was per se impossible in the context of ancillaries because nonlegal
professionals necessarily would influence lawyers' decisions regarding the
efficacy of the law-related service.43 This perceived conflict was deemed too
great to permit."
The ABA Ethics Committee, which proposed the competing version of the
original rule, characterized its professionalism underpinnings as "evok[ing]
remembrance of a pristine professional past that never was and fears of a
subjugated future that never will be."4 5 The Ethics Committee, on the other
hand, argued that lawyers had always treated the practice of law as a business
by receiving significant compensation without compromising the ethical
values inherent in their roles as fiduciaries. Given the history and tradition of
law-related services, the Committee labeled a fear of outside regulation as
na'fve.46 Throughout the twentieth century, state supreme courts gave
themselves exclusive control over the legal profession - despite a decrease
in the proportion of attorneys practicing in the courtroom - thereby ensuring
that the only outside regulation of lawyers by state legislatures would be
through the unlikely state constitutional amendment process.47 Moreover,
lawyers do and must constitute a special profession with unique roles and
responsibilities; this approach also assumed that lawyers do not cease to be
lawyers when they are "wearing their ancillary service 'hats'," but should always
be held to the profession's high standards of ethical and professional conduct.
Block et al., supra note 40, at 744.
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (1991) (repealed 1992), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 248. This influence resulted not merely from the fact
that nonlawyers operated or managed the ancillaries, but from the financial gains to be had by
the lawyer in the event that the customer purchased the services suggested. In this sense, the
concern was of a more ethical nature than one rooted in professionalism. See infra Part V.
44. Much scholarly criticism has focused on these professionalism concerns. See Ted
Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business
Debate asa CaseStudy, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 363 (1993) (arguing that professionalism should have
no place in a debate regarding ethical considerations, but should serve as an aspirational goal).
Schneyer argues that:
[g]ood policymaking (1) identifies the societal risks specific to the practice in
question; (2) gathers reliable data on the magnitude of those risks; (3) identifies
the regulatory responses that might reduce or eliminate whatever risks can be
substantiated; and (4) carefully compares the benefits and costs of the potential
responses, rejecting any response whose costs cannot be justified by offsetting
benefits.
Id. at 366.
45. Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, ABA, Recommendation and Report
to the House of Delegates 1 (1991) (Minority Report of Ralph G. Elliot).
46. Id. at 5; see also Schneyer, supra note 44, at 379-80.
47. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27-31 (1986).
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opponents of the ban on ancillaries argued that little proof existed to
demonstrate a connection between the provision of law-related services and
a decline in service to clients, 48 or to the public in general. 49 A lawyer's
obligation to his clients was absolute and protected by existing Model Rules.50
Lastly, the Ethics Committee asserted that the Model Rules have always
endowed lawyers with considerable trust by granting them discretion
concerning the issues of conflict of interest and undue influence. A rule
banning ancillaries, however, undermines this discretion, contrary to the
overall spirit and tone of the Rules of Professional Conduct.5'
The second line of reasoning underlying the original Rule focused on
matters more suitable for ethical consideration. Its proponents correctly
contended that a complete ban on ancillaries and the provision of law-related
services, unconnected with pre-existing legal matters, would eliminate client
confusion regarding the lawyer's obligations to avoid conflicts of interest,
provide confidentiality, and exercise independent professional judgment.52 In
terms of confidentiality, by limiting the scope of the provision of law-related
services, the Rule ensured, in most instances, that clients would be protected
by the pre-existing Model Rules from a possible breach of confidentiality by
48. See Schneyer, supra note 44, at 374 ("[Ancillary work poses no greater risk of
diminishing one's legal skills than practicing part-time for family reasons, having a side line
unrelated to law, managing a law firm, or participating as house counsel in a client's business
affairs.").
49. Opponents countered that in 1991, Arnold & Porter, the first large firm in the country
to establish ancillaries, received an A rating by the ABA for pro bono service, putting in 129
hours of pro bono service per lawyer, third best among America's largest 100 firms. Id. at 375.
50. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002) (Competence); MODEL
RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002) (Diligence).
51. Opponents of the ban rightly maintained that "It]here was (and is) no evidence, for
example, that lawyers in firms with ancillary services.., have a higher incidence of grievances
alleging failure to uphold the standards of the profession under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct." Section of Real Prop., Probate & Trust Law, et a., ABA, Recommendation and
Report to the House of Delegates 3 (1991); see also Schneyer, supra note 44, at 376. Schneyer
suggests a myriad of outside influences on the lawyer and firm greater than that of an ancillary,
yet deserving of no specific ethical attention outside the Rules governing conflicts: legal-aid
lawyers and lawyers in group legal service programs addressing the competing vision of
program directors regarding legal services; house counsel consulting corporate managers;
"flagship" clients whose business constitutes a significant percentage of total revenue; and
influence by creditors and malpractice insurers. Id.
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmts. 1 & 3 (1991) (repealed 1992),
reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 248-49; ABA Considers Ethics Rule on
Ancillary Businesses, 7 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 29 (Feb. 27, 1991); see also
OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (confidentiality); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002) (conflicts of interest); OKLA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.4 (2002)
(professional independence of a lawyer).
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the lawyer. Moreover, the ban alleviated the attention to be paid to nonclient
customers by prohibiting the provision of any form of law-related services to
persons not receiving legal representation. Finally, by mandating that lawyers
or their employees provide these services, the Rule ensured that, in most
cases, these services were provided in compliance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct.53
Despite its effectiveness, the Rule's prohibition of ancillaries had one
glaring conceptual shortcoming: it drew a line in the sand between legal and
nonlegal services without adequately distinguishing the two. Indeed, the
drafters were guilty of speaking out of both sides of their collective mouths.
The Rule defined law-related services, or "nonlegal services which are
ancillary to the practice of law," as those services that "clearly do not
constitute the practice of law" yet are "functionally connected to the provision
of legal services."5 4 According to the ethical rationale underlying the ban,
however, this "functional" connection between legal and nonlegal services
created such confusion in the minds of customers and clients that lawyers
should be prohibited in providing the services to nonclients5 5 and severely
restricted in providing them to legal clients.56
The confusion surrounding the Rule's definition of law-related services not
only confused clients, but lawyers as well. By concluding that law-related
services, or "nonlegal services ancillary to the practice of law," were practices
the law permitted nonlawyers to perform, the Rule cast a prohibitory umbrella
over services that lawyers historically had provided to customers who received
no other form of representation. In Oklahoma, for example, the Rule would
have barred lawyers from providing lobbying services in most cases.57 As
lobbying does not require a legal degree in Oklahoma, the Rule would have
prohibited a lawyer from lobbying on behalf of a customer unless the
customer's lobbying needs flowed naturally from other legal services the
lawyer provided to the customer.58
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. (1991) (repealed 1992), reprinted in
supra note 21, at 252.
54. Id., reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 249.
55. The proponents of the competing proposal also raised potential First Amendment
concerns arising from the adopted ban, extrapolating principles applicable to law-related
services from Supreme Court holdings addressing lawyer advertising. Standing Comm. on
Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, supra note 45, at 13; see, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 192
(1982); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. (1991) (repealed 1992), reprintedin
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 249.
57. McConnell Interview, supra note 5.
58. Id. McConnell has provided lobbying services to people he considered clients since the
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
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Contrary to the theoretical underpinnings of the Rule, nearly all
jurisdictions defined law-related services as the practice of law when
performed by a lawyer and as nonlegal services when performed by a
nonlawyer professional.59 Accordingly, the Model Rules obliged a lawyer to
extend the ethical benefits of the lawyer-client relationship to the recipient, yet
a nonlegal professional could provide the same services without extending
such privileges. In effect, the Rule would have forced state ethics committees
and lawyers to define the practice of law - a definition that states had not
chosen to create. As one scholar has described the amorphous definition of
the practice of law, "The best that courts and commentators have been able to
come up with is the circular proposition that the practice of law is what
lawyers do !"' Thus, the primary drawback of the original version of Rule 5.7
was not its prohibition against ancillaries, but rather its ambiguity regarding
the delineation between legal and nonlegal assistance - an essential
distinction given the Rule's prohibition of most law-related services.
B. MaintainingFocus: An Attempt to Resolve Customer Confusion
Initially, the ABA assigned the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility the task of examining ancillaries and proposing
a Model Rule if necessary. 6 In 1991, the Standing Committee proposed a
Model Rule that would have avoided the definitional ambiguities inherent in
the eventually adopted Rule 5.7 while at the same time addressing the ethical
issues ancillaries presented.6 2 First, the proposed Rule would have required
1970s. The Rule would have curbed this practice significantly. Id.
59. JONES, supra note 2, at 7 ("There are... many... activities that are regularly regarded
as part of legal practice but that do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law if engaged
in by laypersons.").
60. Id.
61. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 259.
62. The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7 reads as follows:
Rule 5.7 Provision of Ancillary Services
(a) A lawyer who provides, or whose law firm provides, representation to
clients, and who is also associated, or whose law firm is also associated, with an
ancillary business entity:
(1) shall initially disclose in writing to all customers of the ancillary business
entity the nature of the relationship between the lawyer or law firm and the
ancillary business entity; and
(2) shall treat a customer of the ancillary business entity in all respects as a
client under the Rules of Professional Conduct, unless:
(i) the ancillary service is unrelated to any matter in which representation is
provided by the lawyer or the law firm to the customer as a client of the lawyer or
law firm; and
(ii) the lawyer or law firm, directly or through the ancillary business entity, has

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/24

2003]

NOTE

lawyers and firms associated with an ancillary to disclose the nature of the
relationship between the firm, or lawyer, and the subsidiary to all customers.63
Second, with respect to legal clients, the proposed Rule stipulated that the
Rules of Professional Conduct would govern the activities of the ancillary if
the services provided related "in any matter" to the client's legal
representation.6' However, as to client matters unconnected with legal
representation, and nonclients in general, the proposed Rule contemplated a
situation in which the Rules of Professional Conduct would not apply. If, for
example, a lawyer or firm communicated either directly or through an
ancillary that the relationship between the ancillary and the customer was not
that of lawyer-client prior to the commencement of the assistance, then the
ethical duties under the Rules would not apply.65
first clearly communicated to that customer, by means including written
disclosure, that the relationship between the ancillary business entity and the
customer is that of non-legal business and customer, not that of lawyer and client.
(b) In the circumstances in which a customer of an ancillary business entity is
required to be treated as a client pursuant to paragraph (a)(2):
(1) a lawyer who is a partner in the law firm associated with the ancillary
business entity shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the entity has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct with respect to that
customer of all those employed or retained by or associated with the entity
conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct;
(2) a practicing lawyer associated with the ancillary business entity who has
direct supervisory authority over persons employed or retained by or associated
with the entity shall make reasonable efforts to assure that their conduct with
respect to that customer is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer;
(3) a practicing lawyer associated with the ancillary business entity shall be
responsible for conduct with respect to that customer of a person employed or
retained by or associated with the entity that would be a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer and if:
(i) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(ii) the lawyer is a partner in a law firm associated with that entity or has direct
supervisory authority over the person and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take remedial action; and
(4) if the lawyer reasonably should know that the ancillary business entity is
not complying with any obligation imposed by the Rules of Professional Conduct
with respect to the provision of ancillary services to such customers, the lawyer
shall dissociate from the entity unless the entity immediately rectifies the situation.
MODELRULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.7 (proposed 1991), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 21, at 254-55.
63. Id. at 5.7(a)(1), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 254.
64. See id. at 5.7(a)(2)(i), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 254.
65. Id. at 5.7(a)(2)(ii), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 254-55.
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The drafters of the competing proposal reasoned that a ban on ancillaries
was unnecessary if the lawyer, in referring clients to an ancillary, conformed
to the "appropriate standards of professional conduct. ' 66 However, the Rule
contemplated two disclosure requirements. The first disclosure requirement
of the proposed rule, addressing the nature of the relationship between
nonclient customers and lawyers, obligated lawyers and firms to disclose their
financial interest in the provision of the law-related services .67 This mandate
would have been superfluous to legal clients because the Rules already
required the lawyer to disclose his financial interest. 6' The second disclosure
requirement of the proposed rule, addressing the absence of a lawyer-client
relationship between nonclient customers and lawyers, required the lawyer or
firm to treat the customer as a client if the lawyer or firm failed to disclose
their financial interest in serving the nonclient customer.69
Of the two proposals, the second was superior. The proposed rule narrowly
identified risks not otherwise addressed by the Model Rules, while fashioning
a response predicated on ethical principles inherent in the Model Rules;
specifically, the sufficiency of communication between lawyer and client,7 °
and the sufficiency of communication between lawyer and client as a means
to allow the client to make informed decisions.7" Furthermore, while the
proposed Rule correctly focused both on customer confusion regarding the
scope of the relationship between themselves and ancillary service-providers,
and on the conflicts arising from the lawyer's interest in seeing that the
customer receive the law-related services, the adopted Rule erroneously
placed its emphasis on unavoidable potential conflicts - conflicts considered
too great to permit obeisance under the Rules.
IV. Compromise: The CurrentRule
In 1994, the ABA adopted current Rule 5.7 by a wide margin.72 The Rule
was the result of a compromise between the two competing 1991 proposals.
First, it addresses law-related services provided by the lawyer or firm. In such
cases, the Rules of Professional Conduct extend to the customer if the
provision of legal services is not "distinct" from the provision of law-related
66. Id. at 5.7 cmt., reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 256.
67. See id. at 5.7(a)(1), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 254.
68. See id. at 5.7 cmt., reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 21, at 257 (speaking
of the disclosures required by MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a)).
69. Id. at 5.7(2), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 254.
70. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(a) (2002) (conflicts of interest).
71. See, e.g., id. at 1.4 (communication).
72. The Rule "[p]assed on a standing vote 237-183." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21,
at 266.
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services.73 The reasonable belief of the client as to the existence of a lawyerclient relationship determines whether the lawyer or firm satisfies this
requirement.7 4 Second, the Rule addresses ancillaries by stating that the Rules
of Professional Conduct extend to services provided by ancillaries only if the
lawyer or firm fails to take "reasonable measures" to ensure that the customer
knows that (1) the assistance does not constitute legal services, and (2) no
lawyer-client relationship exists. 75 Again, the inquiry focuses on the client whether such reasonable measures have been taken depends on the reasonable
belief of the customer regarding the existence or nonexistence of a lawyerclient relationship.76
The drafters of the current Rule agreed with the 1991 Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility insofar as the risk to be addressed
by an additional ethical mandate was the customer's confusion regarding the
relationship between the service-provider and the customer. The drafters of
the current Rule did not consider professionalism concerns regarding avarice.
Nor did the drafters accept the contention that conflicts arising from the
influence of nonlawyers - chiefly concerned with the revenue-generating
benefits of the service -rendered ancillaries per se impermissible.7 7 Finally,
because the Rule attempts to resolve customer confusion, it contains no

73. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 5.7(a)(1) (2002). The requirements for
distinctness between the legal services and law-related services provided to clients are generally
fact specific. See Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 316 (2001), at
http://www.okbar. org/ethics/316.htm (advising that the offices of the lawyer and the law-related
business be kept physically separate and that the businesses maintain separate letterhead, or
provide clear notice of the relationship between the lawyer and business); JONES, supra note 2,
at 26 ("At a minimum [Rule 5.7 requires the lawyer or firm to] structure and operate the
ancillary business in a manner that makes it clear that the services provided by the business are
separate and distinct from the services offered by the law firm .... ); see also Wis. State Bar
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Memorandum Op. 4/77A (1984), at http://www.wisbar.org/ethop/
memo/mem87.pdf (holding that a law office and another business may occupy the same
building, provided that (1) the entities do not share the same physical space, (2) they maintain
separate telephones, and (3) an office directory exists with separate listings to indicate a
distinction between the two). But see Mass. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.76-10
(1976), at http://massbar.org/ publications/ethics-opinions/article.php?c id=427&vt=2 ("The
use of a single telephone number for both a law office and another profession or business would
be proper provided that the mode of answering the telephone, and the listing in the telephone
directory, do not couple the two.").
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 4 (2002).
75. Id. at 5.7(a)(2).
76. Id. at 5.7 cmt. 3.
77. But see House of Delegates Comm. on Ancillary Bus., ABA, Recommendation and
Report to the House of Delegates 7 (1994) (arguing that the Rule promotes professionalism by
providing ethical guidance).
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specific requirement that the lawyer disclose the nature of the relationship
between himself, or the firm, and the ancillary.78
In contrast to other Rules of Professional Conduct, the ethical duties
provided by Rule 5.7 are in some sense permissive. The Rule does not require
a lawyer to separate the provision of law-related services from legal services
or to take measures to ensure that the customer knows that no lawyer-client
relationship exists in law-related services. When the lawyer chooses not to
perform such tasks, however, the Rule requires him to treat the customer as
a client.79 Thus, Rule 5.7 effectively extends a lawyer's affirmative duty to
nonclient customers in a manner unlike any other in the Rules.80 On the other
hand, when a lawyer or firm fails to ensure that the ancillary and legal practice
are distinct, or make the necessary disclosures, the customer becomes a legal
client. This interpretation of the current Rule corrects a conceptual flaw in the
original version of Rule 5.7. Under the original Rule, lawyers owed a
fiduciary duty to customers when providing law-related services. 8' The flaw
is evident insofar as the provision of most law-related services is considered
the practice of law when provided by a lawyer, and thus the customer already
is deemed a client for purposes of imposing ethical obligations.82 If this same
rationale is applied, current Rule 5.7 serves not as an ethical rule, but as a
loophole that permits a lawyer to avoid ethical duties by meeting the
separation and disclosure requirements of the current Rule.83
Regardless of whether one perceives the current Rule as extending a new
duty of care or merely recognizing a pre-existing duty, its method of
addressing customer confusion provides a benefit the original Rule lacked. By
framing the ethical analysis in terms of the reasonable belief of the customer,
current Rule 5.7 avoids the pitfalls inherent in inquiries regarding the
unauthorized practice of law. Although the current Rule defines law-related
services as those that "might reasonably be performed in conjunction with and
in substance are related to the provision of legal services, and that are not
78. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCr R. 5.7(a)(1) (proposed 1991), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 21, at 254.

79. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(a) (2002).
80. For example, Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c) extends a duty to
nonclients only to prohibit the lawyer from behaving dishonestly when dealing with the
community at large. Id. at 8.4(c).
81. See supra Part III.A.
82. JONES, supra note 2, at 7 ("There are ...many... activities that are regularly regarded
as part of legal practice but that do not constitute the unauthorized practice of law if engaged
in by laypersons.").
83. See id. at 26 ("Rule 5.7 provides a 'safe harbor' for lawyers to provide law-related
services without the necessity of conforming to the rules of practice normally applicable to legal
services.").
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prohibited as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer,"'
the Rule does not pass judgment upon the nature or appropriateness of the
law-related service at issue. Consequently, it does not compel lawyers to
differentiate between legal services and law-related services. While
ancillaries cannot perform acts prohibited as the unauthorized practice of
law,85 the ethical analysis under current Rule 5.7 correctly asks whether the
customer perceives the services as the practice of law, not whether the
services are objectively legal, nonlegal, or law-related.
V. Recourse to Existing Rules: An Argument for the Adequacy of
DisclosureMechanisms and Per Se ProhibitedTransactionsin Addressing
Client Needs in the Ancillary Context
A. Improper Influence in the Ancillary Context as a Form of Conflict of
Interest
Proponents of the ban on ancillary services contended at the time of the
1991 Rule8 6 and proponents today assert" that the influence of nonlawyers,
involved in the operation of ancillaries, on the decision-making process of
lawyers and firms, is inadequately addressed under the Rules of Professional
Conduct.88 However, existing ethics rules - lending themselves to factspecific inquiries rather than per se prohibitions of ancillaries - properly
address this threat to the lawyer's independent professional judgment.
Specifically, ABA ethics committees and various state bar associations have
employed their respective versions of Model Rule 1.8(a) and 1.7(b) in
response to these concerns.8 9 Model Rule 1.7(b) addresses conflicts between
84. MODEL RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(b) (2002).
85. See id. at 5.4; see also discussion supra note 15.
86. See MODELRuLEsOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 5.7 cmt.2 (1991) (repealed 1992), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 21, at 248.
87. Arash Mostafavipour, Mixing Law and Other Business Service: Law Finns: Should
They Mind Their Own Business?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 435, 441 (1998).
88. A common justification given for the strict regulation or prohibition of ancillaries is
predicated on the ineffectiveness ofstate disciplinary authorities to prosecute wrongdoers under
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Although not addressed in this Note, proponents of this
view assert that adding nonlawyer managers of ancillaries to the list of individuals capable of
conducting transactions requiring disciplinary oversight places too great a burden on the bar.
See, e.g., Kevin Arquit, FTC Unit Lauds Law-Firm Diversification,LEGALTIMES, Apr. 8, 1991,
at 14; Mostafavipour, supra note 87, at 440-41.
89. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 418 (2000)
(holding that a lawyer satisfies the disclosure requirements of Rule 1.8(a) if he explains the
important features of the arrangement and its material consequences); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Op. 753 (2002), at http://www.nysba.orglTemplate.cfm?Section=
Ethics- Opinions ("Where a client is represented by a lawyer and uses an ancillary business
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the client's interest and the financial interest of the lawyer or firm by requiring
the lawyer to consult with the client regarding the pros and cons of the
proposed conduct.9" Model Rule 1.8(a) governs transactions with clients by
obligating the lawyer to disclose, in writing, his interest in the transaction. 9'
The Comment to Rule 5.7 indicates that when a lawyer-client relationship
exists prior to the provision of law-related services, by an ancillary or
otherwise, the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.8(a).92 The nonlawyer
ancillary manager shares the conflicting interest of the lawyer or firm - an
interest in the income to be derived from the provision of the law-related
services. Thus, a separate ethical inquiry pertaining to the influence of the
nonlawyer on the lawyer or firm regarding the transaction becomes
unnecessary. The potential financial gain of the lawyer constitutes the
conflicting ethical interest. Without this interest, the ancillary manager lacks
any independent basis for influencing the decisions of the lawyer or firm
regarding the client's need for law-related services. It is this financial interest
of the lawyer in the ancillary that is of particular importance to the client when
considering the propriety of the lawyer's recommendation. Consequently,
Rule 1.8(a) requires that the lawyer disclose this interest.
B. The Effectiveness of Specific Inquiries:An Oklahoma Case Study
An analysis of recent Oklahoma caselaw demonstrates both the
ineffectiveness of and the significant conflicts issues caused by a bright-line
rule banning ancillaries while simultaneously permitting a wide variety of
owned by the lawyer, the rules applicable to personal conflicts of interest and transactions
between clients and lawyers continue to apply .. ");N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal
Op. 1998-99/14 (2000) at http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO98-99-14.pdf (holding that the rules
applying to an ancillary insurance venture include New Hampshire Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.7(b) and New Hampshire Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a)).
90. MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 1.7(b) (2002) (mandating consultation with the
client in the event that the representation might be materially limited by the lawyer's own
interest).
91. Id. at 1.8(a) (The Rule forbids a lawyer transacting business with a client unless (1) the
transaction and terms are fair and reasonable; (2)the terms are disclosed to the client in writing;
(3) the lawyer receives the opportunity to seek another lawyer regarding the transaction; (4) the
client consents in writing; and (5) the lawyer's discloses his interest to the client). Under the
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(a), the lawyer's duty to disclose his interest has
been inferred from the language of 1.8(a)(1) (1988), which requires that the "transaction and
terms on which the lawyer acquiresthe interest are fair and reasonable ...and fully disclosed."
Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 316 (1998), at http://www.okbar.org/
ethics/316.htm. A similar approach can be found in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.H. Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1998-99/14 (2000), at http://www.nhbar.org/pdfs/FO98-9914.pdf.
92. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. 10 (2002).
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other law-related services, as long as those services are provided to a client
with in connection with a current legal matter. In 2001, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of ancillaries in State of Oklahoma ex
rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Israel.93 In Israel, the respondent lawyer
and a nonlawyer formed a corporation to help Oklahoma mothers collect
court-ordered child support.94 The lawyer contracted separately with the
ancillary corporation's customers to obtain support orders and to establish
paternity, if necessary." The lawyer and the ancillary agreed to pay costs and
defer fees in return for a percentage of the support checks. When the firm
96
collected checks, it subtracted its fees and sent the remainder to the mother.
At the onset of the arrangement, the lawyer verbally informed the mother of
his financial interest in the ancillary, yet failed to disclose the interest in
writing or obtain her written consent. 97 The OBA filed a three-count
complaint, alleging violations of Oklahoma Rules 1.7(b), 1.8(a), and 5.4(b). 98
The court held that no violation of the partnership provision (Rule 5.4(b))
occurred because the nonlawyer ancillary manager performed ministerial tasks
that did not constitute the practice of law. 99 Additionally, the court held that
no violation of the conflict provisions occurred because the ancillary did not
earn income unless the customer did; therefore, the lawyer's personal financial
interests flowing from the ancillary were consistent with the legal interests of
his client.'" Interestingly, the court disregarded the clear language of Rule
1.8(a) and held that the lawyer's verbal disclosure of his financial interest in
the transaction between his client and the ancillary satisfied th&requirements
of the Oklahoma Rules.' 0 1
Israel demonstrates the folly in a per se ban on ancillaries as well as the
importance of a fact-specific inquiry into potential conflicts and required
disclosures in the context of ancillaries and law-related services. Indeed, the
only influence the ancillary could have exercised would have been to
encourage a more zealous representation. As Israel illustrates, the conflicts
between the financial interests of ancillaries and the interests of their
93. 2001 OK 42, 25 P.3d 909.
94. Id. 2, 25 P.3d at 910.
95. Id.
96. Id. 3, 25 P.3d at 910
97. Id. 18, 25 P.3d at 914.
98. Id. 11, 25 P.3d at 913.
99. Id. 21, 25 P.3d at 914.
100. Id. 16, 25 P.3d at 914.
101. Id. 18, 25 P.3d at 914. The Court suggested that "[in any business association with
a client, written disclosure of a lawyer's interest is certainly the safest course. Written disclosure
in this matter would have eliminated any question concerning what the client was told." Id.
19, 25 P.3d at 914.
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customers vary according to the services provided. By understanding that the
referral of a client to an ancillary constitutes a business transaction, in which
the lawyer or firm's representation may be materially limited by an adverse
interest, it is evident that pre-existing disclosure requirements adequately
address the need for the client to be fully informed about the legal advice he
receives.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is a situation where a lawyer, engaged
by a client to give advice in estate planning, refers the client to an ancillary in
which the lawyer owns an interest. The lawyer refers the client so that the
ancillary can provide law-related services connected with the sale of insurance
or securities. Again, the pre-existing ethics rules provide adequate protection
for the client and guidance for the lawyer. In 2001, the Legal Ethics
Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association 10 2 addressed this issue, as well
as the more general issue of a lawyer or firm offering insurance or securities
as an in-house law-related service. In Ethics Opinion 316,103 the committee
held that a lawyer could sell insurance and securities products to a client as
long as he properly disclosed his interest as required by Rule 1.8(a)."0 The
committee reasoned that full disclosure should include (1) the existence of a
financial relationship with the ancillary; (2) the means by which the lawyer
will be compensated as a result of the referral; and (3) why the lawyer is
recommending the product, including a comparative analysis of alternative
products applicable to the clients needs."5 The committee embraced a factspecific inquiry by specifying that in certain circumstances such a referral is
barred because the client cannot give informed consent. For example, when
102. Tom McConnell, a member of the Rules of Professional Conduct Committee of the
OBA, indicates that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma defers to the advisory opinions of the
Legal Ethics Committee of the OBA in almost every instance. McConnell Interview, supra note
5. But see Israel, 2001 OK 42, 25 P.2d 909.
103. Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 316 (2001), athttp:llwww.okbar.
org/ethics/316.htm.
104. Id. Other states similarly have held that a lawyer may sell the client - either directly
or by means of a referral to an ancillary - insurance or securities in connection with a legal
estate plan. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 1995-140 (1995), at http://www.
calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-generic.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/Attomey%2OResources/
Ethics%201nformation/Ethics%200pinions (finding that a lawyer may refer his client to an
insurance agent and receive a commission for the referral so long as the lawyer fully discloses
his interest); State Bar of Mich., Ethics Op. No. RI-135 (1992), at http://www.michbar.org
(holding that a lawyer/insurance agent may sell insurance to clients with full disclosure of
interest); S.C. Bar, Advisory Op. 90-16 (1990), at http://www.scbar.org/opinions/9016.htm
(holding that a law firm may refer estate-planning clients to an insurance agency in which the
firm has a 50% interest given sufficient disclosure of the interest).
105. Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 316 (2001), at http://www.
okbar.org/ethics/316.htm.
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the client is infirm or elderly, the trust placed in the lawyer and the incapacity
of the client to comprehend the alternatives may foreclose the lawyer referring
' Tamila Rother and Elizabeth K. Brown, members
the client to the ancillary. 06
of the committee and participants in the drafting of Advisory Opinion 316,
point out that the opinion recognizes the growing sophistication of the legal
client.0 7 This sophistication permits the increasing use of disclosure
mechanisms to overcome potential conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the
opinion starkly contrasts the conservative approach to ancillaries, which was
advocated by both the drafters of the original Model Rule 5.7 and the
opponents of ancillaries - who feared the inevitable manipulation of legal
clients for personal gain.
A prohibition deeming certain transactions with clients to be per se
impermissible does not weaken the argument but merely demonstrates the
effectiveness of other Rules in protecting clients in the ancillary context.
Other states have concluded that estate-planning lawyers may neither refer
clients to an ancillary nor sell clients financial products connected with a legal
recommendation. For example, the New York State Bar Association held in
1991 that regardless of the disclosures provided, the client could not give
informed consent to receive law-related services provided by an insurance
ancillary because of the wide array of insurance products that are available at
differing costs.'08 The Rhode Island Bar Association's Ethics Advisory Panel
has similarly concluded that a lawyer's financial interest in a particular
insurance ancillary bars his ability to refer clients to it, regardless of his belief
in the propriety of the suggested estate-planning vehicle.' 09
The aforementioned ethical scenarios demonstrate two important points
pertaining to the ethical treatment of ancillaries. First, they illustrate the gap
106. Id.
107. Interview with Tamila Rother, Member, Okla. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., in
Norman, Okla. (Feb. 6, 2003). Ms. Rother is a partner with Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C., in
Oklahoma City. The firm has no ownership interest in an ancillary. However, William G. Paul,
Of Counsel, participated in the drafting of Rule 5.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
stating at the time that the Rule "simply gives lawyers who are already providing nonlegal
services needed ethical guidance." Ancillary Business Rule Emergesfrom ABA Meeting, 10
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 29 (Feb. 23, 1994) (quoting William G. Paul, Chair,
Drafting Committee Model Rule 5.7); Interview with Elizabeth K. Brown, Member, Okla. Bar
Ass'n Legal Ethics Comm., in Norman, Okla. (Feb. 3, 2003). Ms. Brown is a partner with
Phillips, McFall, McCaffrey, McVay and Murrah, P.C., in Oklahoma City. The firm offers the
law-related services at issue in Advisory Opinion 316 of the Legal Ethics Committee of the
Oklahoma Bar Association. Id.
108. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 619 (1991) (prohibiting an estateplanning lawyer who is also an insurance broker from selling insurance to clients regardless of
the disclosures regarding his interests).
109. R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Opinion No. 96-26, at 2-3 (1996).
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between the mandates of the 1991 adopted Rule and the policies it sought to
promote, which were a decrease in lawyer overreaching and a decrease in
lawyer participation in business endeavors at odds with the needs of clients.
Because Israel involved an entity operated by a nonlawyer, the Rule would
have prohibited the ancillary despite a lack of any conflict of interest.
Conversely, the Rule would have permitted the practice at issue in Oklahoma
Advisory Opinion 316 if the lawyer or firm provided the investment vehicle,
despite the split in opinion regarding the effectiveness of disclosure
mechanisms in overcoming a conflict between the financial interests of the
lawyer or firm and the legal needs of the client. Second, the ethical scenarios
illustrate the effectiveness of the other Rules of Professional Conduct in
addressing the unique conflicts that arise in the context of ancillaries and lawrelated services. The scope of the Rules is sufficiently broad to permit ethical
inquiries into the effect nonlawyer managers and operators of an ancillary
have on the lawyer. Their influence is limited by the financial interest of the
lawyer or firm, and this interest is amenable to ethical examination under pre5.7 Rules.
VI. Importing TransactionDisclosuresinto the Rule
A. The DisclosureObligations Under the Model Rule
Under the transaction provisions of the Model Rules, the disclosure
required in order for a lawyer to refer a client to an ancillary far exceeds the
disclosure required by Model Rule 5.7 when a lawyer refers a nonclient to an
ancillary. Rule 5.7 requires only that the lawyer or firm take reasonable
measures to ensure that the customer knows that the services received from
the ancillary "are not legal services and [thus] the protections of the clientlawyer relationship do not exist."" This requirement is consistent with the
narrow risk Rule 5.7 contemplates alleviating - namely, customer confusion
regarding the nature and scope of the relationship between him and the
ancillary."' The lawyer must provide the disclosure required by Rule 5.7
before the commencement of the law-related services, preferably in writing." 2
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7(a)(2) (2002).

111. Id. at5.7cmt. l.
112. Id. at 5.7 cmt. 6; see, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 755 (2002),
at http://www.nysba.org/ContentlNavigationMenu/Attomey-Resources/Ethics-Opinions/
Opinion_755.htm ("[W]hile a client will ordinarily be presumed to believe that the non-legal
services are the subject of an attorney-client relationship, that presumption will not apply if the
lawyer advises the client in writing 'that the services are not legal services and that the protection
of an attorney-client relationship does not exist with respect to the non-legal services."); see also
JONES, supra note 2, at 60. James W. Jones offers this disclosure language in a sample retainer
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Disclosures of specific facts - (1) that the services are not legal services and
(2) that no lawyer-client relationship exists - are conceptually easier to
satisfy than the disclosure required when the potential customer is a legal
client - the Rules meet a greater risk with a greater mandate.
B. The DisclosureObligations Under the Oklahoma Rule
Practitioners should know that although eleven states have adopted a
version of Model Rule 5.7, only Oklahoma has added express language to the
Comment, addressing the specific nature of the disclosure. The Comment to
Rule 5.7, imputing language from Oklahoma Advisory Opinion 316, expressly
suggests that the disclosure include written notice of the lawyer or firm's
interest in the ancillary." 3 While nondisclosure is not objectionable from a
policy perspective, it is contrary to the reasonable steps necessary to eliminate
the risk of customer confusion contemplated by the drafters of the Model
Rule. The customer need not know of the lawyer or law firm's interest in
order to reasonably understand the lack of the lawyer-client relationship.
Nevertheless, there it is, an anomaly in an otherwise well-crafted, narrowly
tailored, and effective ethical Rule.
VII. Conclusion
An examination of the ends and the means of any law provides guidance for
following its mandate. The history of Model Rule 5.7 exemplifies ethical
overreaching. The original Rule was an attempt by the ABA to stop large
firms from exploring new business models and, in the process, prohibit the
single practitioner from providing those services he has always considered the
practice of law. Oklahoma was wise to wait for an ethical rule that identified
the potential risks ancillaries present, and to respond by addressing the risks
with a narrow and effective disclosure requirement.

agreement:
(a) Client acknowledges that S&J is [a wholly owned subsidiary of] [partially
owned by] the law firm of Smith & Jones, and that the attorneys of Smith & Jones
have made a substantial contribution in time, effort, and financial resources toward
S&J's success. Client also acknowledges that, notwithstanding its relationship to
Smith &Jones, S&J does not practice law and the services that S&J offers are not
legal services. Accordingly, Client understands and acknowledges that, in
retaining S&J, Client will not have the benefits of an attorney-client relationship
and that the protections of attorney-client privilege will not attach to its
communications with S&J.
Id. (alteration in original).
113. OKLA. RuLEs OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 5.7 cmt. (2002).
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It remains unclear whether Rule 5.7 will serve in Oklahoma as a safeharbor, whereby firms can escape their responsibilities as legal fiduciaries, or
extend a new duty, to nonclient customers. Furthermore, confusion still exists
surrounding the point at which legal services end and law-related services
begin. Certainly, however, Rule 5.7 compels a lawyer financially tied to an
ancillary to tell the customer where he stands. If he fails to do so, the Rule
does it for him.
D. Kencade Babb
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